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Corporate Financing and Anticipated Credit
Rating Changes
Abstract
Firm circumstances change but rating agencies may not make
timely revisions to their ratings, therby increasing information asym-
metry between rms and the market. We examine whether rms time
the securities market before a credit rating agency publicly reveals
its decision to change a rms credit rating. Using quarterly data,
we show that rms adjust their nancing structures before credit rat-
ing downgrades are publicly revealed. Specically, rms on average
increase their debt nancing by 1.29% before the disclosure of a rat-
ing downgrade, and this increase is due to the issuance of debt rather
than the repurchase of equity. In contrast, rms do not take signicant
nancing actions before credit rating upgrades.
JEL classication: G24, G32
Keywords: Credit rating downgrades, Credit rating upgrades, In-
formation asymmetry, Capital structure
1. Introduction
In this paper we explore the hypothesis that rms exploit information asym-
metry and adjust their nancing activities before information about a change
in their credit rating is publicly revealed. We show that rms facing down-
grades exploit their presently higher ratings by increasing their debt ratio.
Our research highlights the importance of credit ratings for rmsnancial
policies.
A change in the issuers credit rating reects a substantial change in the
long-term credit worthiness of the rm, and therefore is an important event.
This change assigns a di¤erent quantitative category, which may derive dis-
crete costs and benets of moving to a di¤erent rating level (Kisgen 2006,
2009). It can result in adjustments in security prices (Hand, Holthausen,
and Leftwich 1992; Kliger and Sarig 2000) or a¤ect the rms access to the
external debt market (Kisgen 2006).
Our study is motivated by evidence that rating agencies do not change
ratings in a timely manner to reect the up-to-date nancial condition of a
rm. The Association for Financial Professionals (AFP) conducted a survey
in 2002 and reported that most respondents do not believe changes in their
companys nances are promptly reected in the ratings, with the delay
often believed to be around six months.1
1Empirical studies have o¤ered some explanations for the observed delay in rating
changes. Altman and Rijken (2004) and Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006), among
others, report that rating agencies may grant issuers time to recover before taking rating
actions, and that rating agencies who pursue rating accuracy and stability to maintain
1
In this paper, we argue that the di¤erence between the moment when the
updated information about the rms creditworthiness emerges internally
and the moment when a rating agency announces a change in credit rating
creates a window of increased information asymmetry between the rm and
investors. This is because managers have rst-hand information about the
rms nancial circumstances, operating performance, growth opportunities
and future prospects, while investors may not have easy access to such up-
to-date information. Moreover, rating agencies typically hold meetings with
the rm to gather information for analysis and then notify the rm on the
rating opinions preceding the publication and dissemination of the outcome.2
Our ratings data come from Standard and Poors and thus we use the
gure (Figure 1), from Standard and Poors to illustrate the information
transmission mechanism in their process.3 As shown in Figure 1, their process
suggests that the rating agency and the rm share common information sets
(in particular during stages 5 and 6). However, the rm might not be able to
have direct communications with the rating agency about the exact timing
for the release of the rating change information because the timing of the
release of information is up to the judgement of the rating agency.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
their professional reputations do not revise credit ratings if the expected impact on credit
quality of an event is considered as being temporary, uncertain or reversible.
2For details and a diagram on the rating process, see:
http://www.standardandpoors.com/
aboutcreditratings/ RatingsManual_PrintGuide.html.
3https://www.spratings.com/about/about-credit-ratings/ratings-process.html
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Consequently, rmmanagers are able to foresee rating changes for the rm
in the near future with greater precision than investors, based on their better
knowledge of the rms nancial condition, their understandings about the
agencys rating criteria and their communications with the rating agency. We
term this asymmetry in information about future ratings as the information
gap. As such, periods before rating changes increase the information gap
between managers and investors. Intuitively, a rm may require additional
nancing in order to sustain operations when facing deteriorating nancial
conditions It is plausible that the rm raises more debt at the time of
becoming more likely to be downgraded. We model and test whether rms
exploit this information gap by increasing debt just before a downgrade. We
argue that rms have incentives to take actions in order to take advantage
of the overvalued debt when ratings are about to be downgraded.
We forecast the probability of a downgrade a quarter ahead using a logit
model that incorporates the present realizations of rm characteristics and
rm actions like increasing debt and/or equity, for a large sample of U.S.
industrial rms from 1985 to 2010. The rating forecast model incorporates
the quarter-end stock price, which reects investorsinformation of the rm
available to the market by the time of rm capital structure activities. In
utilizing such price information, we allow the exibility that investors are
able to gather signals about the nancial health of the rm. This alleviates
the possibility of a downgrade due to increased debt of a rm a quarter
3
earlier4. It is not surprising that an increase in debt increases the probability
of long-term rating downgrade. Most importantly, we seek to understand
whether the rm possesses superior information not available to the public
about a future downgrade in the rms long-term credit rating. To this end,
we use the residual of the logit model as the information gap to capture the
superior information of the rm managers.
We then model the relation between the rms nancing adjustments
and the estimated information gap about a rating downgrade, controlling
for a set of conventional rm characteristics. This research design estimates
the information gap model and the nancing adjustment model together
as a simultaneous system. This further mitigates the potential problem of
simultaneity bias in the nancing change model that can be interpreted as
the possibility that the future downgrade is due to additional borrowing.
The use of quarterly data further reduces potential misinterpretation that
part of our ndings might be due to a credit rating agency rapidly responding
to capital structure adjustments. The typical delay in credit rating adjust-
ments of around six months reduces the probability that this change occurs
in the same or in the subsequent quarter of the capital structure change. In
addition, when changes in capital structure drive credit rating adjustments,
we would expect similar e¤ects of debt issues and stock repurchases.
Our main nding is that the information gap signicantly a¤ects rms
4Hand, et. al (1992) and Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) nds similar results after
rating downgrade.
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nancing activities, particularly for speculative graded rms, at least one
quarter before the rating change taking place, and also in the same quarter
of the rating change. Firms that anticipate downgrades signicantly increase
debt nancing by 1.29%, but do not adjust their equity nancing. In con-
trast, we nd that rms do not take signicant nancing actions one quarter
before and in the same quarter of credit rating upgrades.
In our sample, downgraded rms have lower liquidity than those non-
downgraded rms, on average, highlighting the nancial constraints of those
downgraded rms, which restrict their ability to deleverage before a down-
grade. In other words, rms that anticipate downgrades tend not to enjoy
a luxury choice of trying to cut debt to improve credit quality. Instead,
they raise more debt at the present time when debt is still relatively cheap
compared to the debt costs once a downgrade is realized. This suggests a
channel through which debt overvaluation occurs, which is not derived from
the information content already being released to the market but is due to
the late release of credit rating information.
The absence of equity changes, as shown in our Tables 1 and 4, is because
net equity issues are small for downgraded rms (while much larger for non-
downgraded rms). As a result, rms on average increase their debt ratio by
1.27% when they anticipate long-term credit rating downgrades in the next
quarter.
We relate to studies on credit ratings and capital structure. For example,
Maung and Chowdhury (2014) examine rm leverage in the year of and after
5
a credit rating change. Most notably, Kisgen (2006) nds that rms adjust
their leverage to avoid credit rating downgrades. Issuing debt when it is
not yet publicly known that the rms credit rating will deteriorate is likely
to exploit ine¢ ciencies in the market and maximizes current shareholders
value. We focus on the rms that are actually downgraded, and examine
rmsactions before the information about this downgrade is released.5
Overall, our ndings suggest that rms make nancing adjustments when
they have information about an upcoming credit rating downgrade that in-
vestors might not have. The important implication from our study for regula-
tors is that requiring prompt credit rating updates will reduce the information
advantage of managers and could benet new debt holders.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our frame-
work of the information gap and our hypothesis. Section 3 presents the data
and sample. Sections 4 and 5 present the methodology and report the results.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. A model of an information gap
Credit ratings are very important in nancial markets. This is not only be-
cause of the fact that ratings e¤ectively provide an entry ticket for rms
to enter into the debt market, but also that rating changes often lead to
adjustments in security prices (Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich 1992), the
5Also related is Kisgen (2009), who examines rm behavior after a credit rating down-
grade is announced.
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nancing costs of rms as well as the existing credit and debt agreements
of the rm. Lö­ er (2013) claims that "agency ratings exhibit important
characteristics one would expect from ratings that see through the cycle".
Kliger and Sarig (2000) show that rmsdebt value increases (decreases) and
equity value falls (rises) when realized ratings are better (worse) than ex-
pected ratings. In addition, policy makers have drafted nancial regulations
such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act with references to credit ratings, giving rise to
an endorsement value of ratings. Any information pointing toward a future
change in the credit rating of a rm is therefore crucial for the stakeholders
of the rm and may inuence the rms nancing decisions. Graham and
Harvey (2001), for example, report that 57.1% of CFOs see credit ratings as
important when they determine their rmscapital structure.
There is evidence that rms share and exchange information with rating
agencies. Kliger and Sarig (2000) argue that instead of revealing information
to the public, which may benet competitors, rms provide rating agencies
with detailed insider information during the rating process. Kisgen (2006)
states that rating agencies may receive signicant company information that
is not public. Similarly, rating agencies provide feedback to rms, as is shown
in Figure 1. Thus, we postulate that rmsprivate communications to rating
agencies may allow them to better anticipate the likelihood of future rating
changes relative to the public. In our setup, a change in ratings, released as
public news by ratings agencies, occurs in quarter t+ 1.
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2.1. The model
In our framework there are two types of rms with regard to rating changes
in the next quarter: (i) badrms who anticipate their ratings to be down-
graded, and (ii) otherswho anticipate their ratings either to be upgraded
or to remain unchanged. We use the otherscategory as a baseline in our
test. Both types of rms, badand others, face possible delays in informa-
tion arrival about a change in ratings. We specify a model in which a rating
agency will announce at time t+ 1 a downgrade in the rating of a badrm
i. Let IDi;t+1 be the indicator of the downgrade event which takes a value of
1 when the downgrade arrives, and zero otherwise. In our framework, any
market participant or investor other than the rms managers and the rating
agencies only have access to publicly available information at time t.
Dene Xi;t as the information that is publicly available about rm i in-
cluding any publicly observable action taken by the rm that might a¤ect
the downgrade event at time t. After observing the action, the investors can
infer the potential consequences of such an action on IDi;t+1. The downgrade
event also depends on the set Zt, which is the information privately available
to the rm and the rating agency at time t.
Let ID (Xi;t; Zi;t) be the function of a downgrade for rm i at time t based
on the information sets Xi;t and Zi;t. Let dt = 1 indicate the rating agencys
decision with probability  to announce the outcome from the indicator func-
tion ID (Xi;t; Zi;t) at time t+1 rather than at t; else with probability 1  for
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dt = 0 that the rating agency decides to announce at time t. In other words,
the probability of delaying the agencys assessment outcome to the public is
. Therefore, when the rating agency decides not to reveal the downgrade
information until t + 1; the public observes this downgrade event as IDi;t+1
only until time t+ 1; but not at t:
Thus, the downgrade decision from the rating agency observed by the
public is:
IDi;t+1 = dtIDt (Xi;t; Zi;t) (1)
where IDi;t+1 is the observed downgrade event at t+1 on rm i, and ID (Xi;t; Zi;t)
is the assessment outcome of the downgrade function for rm i at time t:6
Equation (1) shows the equivalence between a delay and the event of no
downgrade. Thus the investor has to predict the event without full knowl-
edge of the rms a¤airs (Zi;t), whereas the manager only needs to predict
the delay by the rating agency.
For the investor without the knowledge of Zt; her expectation at time t
of a downgrade at time t+ 1 in the rating of rm i is:
Et
IDt+1Xi;t = E dtE IDt (Xi;t; Zi;t)Xi;t
= E

IDt (Xi;t; Zi;t)
Xi;t
 bIDt+1 (Xi;t)
6According to the model, when there is no delay in the rating agencys rating announce-
ment, i.e.,  = 0 such that with 100% probability dt = 0; then at time t+ 1 the indicator
IUi;t+1 of the upgrade event takes a value of zero. The observed rating change therefore
occurs in the same period as soon as the indicator function gives its assessment outcome.
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Similarly, for the manager of rm i who has the knowledge of Xt and Zt; the
expectation of a rating downgrade is:
Et
IDt+1Xi;t; Zi;t = ID (Xi;t; Zi;t)
The information gap between the rm manager and the investor for a rating
downgrade for rm i is therefore:
Et
IDt+1Xt; Zt  Et IDt+1Xi;t =  hID (Xt; Zt)  bIDt+1 (Xi;t)i
 GDi;t+1:
2.2. An empirical model of an information gap
In order to capture the expectation in rating changes of the outsiderswho
use public information, we use a logit model to capture the likelihood of a
downgrade (as in IDt ) in the next period based on the information available
in the current period. Specically, we construct indicator LTDDi;t+1 for a
downgrade, on the long-term debt rating for rm i in quarter t+ 1 as:
LTDDi;t+1 =
8><>: 1; SPLT i;t+1 < SPLT i;t0; otherwise (2)
where SPLT i;t and SPLT i;t+1 are, respectively, the Compustat data items
for the S&P domestic long-term issuer credit rating for rm i at quarters t
and t + 1. S&P long term credit rating reects Standard & Poors view of
10
the obligors capacity and willingness to meet its long-term nancial com-
mitments.
It is important to note that there is a distinct di¤erence between our
downgrade indicators and those of Kisgen (2006). Kisgen (2006) denes rms
being rated with a +at the beginning of the year as an upgrade indicator
and rms being rated with a -as a downgrade indicator. An alternative
indicator may be the so called CreditWatch announced by rating agencies,
which is a qualitative opinion about the rms prospect. However, according
to Standard and Poors, CreditWatch is not intended to include all ratings
under review, and rating changes may occur without the ratings having rst
appeared on CreditWatch.7
In our study, we look at the actual change in ratings from quarter t to
t + 1. We consider this a realistic classication of the direction of rating
changes for our purposes.8
Thus the downgrade decision from the rating agency is based on decision
model:
LTDDi;t+1 = IDi;t+1 = dtID(Xi;t; Zi;t) (3)
where Xi;t is a vector of observable state variables and rm actions that
captures the changes to capital structure of the rm, and Zi;t is a vector of
unobserved decision variables.
7See, page 8 on http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/general/RatingsDirect_Commentary_979212_06_22_2012_12_42_54.pdf
8For example, when the US and UK government bond ratings were moved from AAA
to AA+, the plusstatus does not mean that they are now more likely to be upgraded in
the near future. Instead, they were considered as a downgrade by the market.
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Since only Xi;t is observed by the public, the logit model is estimated by
the public as:
E(LTDDi;t+1
Xi;t) = exp(X 0i;t)
1 + exp(X 0i;t)
: (4)
Specically, we regress the downgrade outcome LTDDi;t+1 on the state
variables: Leveragei;t, Profiti;t, Sizei;t, Pricei;t, and Liquidityi;t (see also
Ederington and Yawitz, 1986), controlling for both the industry and quarter
xed e¤ects.9 It is plausible that when rms increase their leverage (4deti;t)
or decrease their equity (4eqti;t) through share repurchase, the likelihood of
a downgrade increases. The changes in capital structure 4deti;t; 4eqti;t in
equation 3 are publicly observable. Thus, our framework accommodates the
ability of outside investors of observing4deti;t; 4eqti;t, and hence being able
to predict the possibility of a downgrade in the next period.
Having estimated equation 3, we obtain the forecasted probability (also
9The use of the market stock price of a rm is to recognize that i) stock prices may
reect all publicly available information about a rm, which includes the information about
a rms actions that, in our context, are the changes in debt and equity, and ii) investors
can incorporate the price information into their prediction for a credit rating change in
the next period, in addition to all other nancial variables of a rm as we included in our
logit regression. Essentially, our logit regression allows for possible information such as
the price variable for investors to predict a rating change.
Although one might consider other potential candidate variables to allow the incorpo-
ration of rm information such as corporate bond yields or the credit default swap spread.
Crucially important, however, the change in debt in our analysis includes changes in long-
term debt and current debt of a rm, which in our sample consists of not only corporate
bonds but also other types of debt that are not necessarily publicly traded. Also corporate
bonds are typically thinly traded. Thus, the relevant bond yield of a rm in any period
may not be su¢ cient and readily available for analyzing all the sample rms. Moreover,
only a small fraction of rms have credit default swaps traded in the OTC market, which
is typical for these derivatives contracts. Hence, it is not feasible to utilize these candi-
date variables for the analysis of the information gap model. Given the relatively higher
price discovering e¢ ciency of the stock price, we use this variable to capture all possible
information publicly available to the market.
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see the Appendix) of rating downgrades [LTD
D
i;t+1 for rm i in quarter t+ 1
as dened below:
[LTD
D
i;t+1 = Prob
 
LTDDi;t+1 = 1
Xi;t (5)
We use the rare events small sample bias correction method of King and Zeng
(2001) on our model, as the large majority of rm-quarters are not associated
with downgrades.
Next, we dene the gap between the realized rating change at time t+ 1
and the outsidersexpectation of a rating change based on public information
for a downgrade, respectively, as:
GLTDDi;t+1 = LTD
D
i;t+1  [LTD
D
i;t+1 (6)
which is a function of the unobserved variables Zi;t (see Cramer, 2005).
In our framework, the managers have superior information relative to
the public, and the gap dened above captures the content of the superior
information reected in Zi;t, which is instrumented by the information gap.
We examine whether this residual private information has value and is related
to changes in capital structure.
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2.3. Foreseeable downgrades and firm actions
Consider a rm that faces negative future prospects the current rating of
the rm may over evaluate its credit quality. A rating downgrade coming
late may thus grant opportunities for the rm to hold back the unfavorable
information from the outsiders, and allow a time window for the rm to
conduct nancing at relatively lower costs than the would-be cost level had
the unfavorable information being revealed without delay.
Formally, dene the market value of the rm at time t as:
Ait = Eit +Dit
where Eit and Dit are, respectively, the market values of equity and debt of
rm i at time t. A rating downgrade will lead to a reduction of the rm value
which will lower the market value of the rm to ADi;t+1 at time t+ 1 :
ADi;t+1  Ait + ID (Xit; Zit) Ait+1 < Ait;
Hence, the expected market value of the rm by the manager, having taken
into account of the probability  of delaying rating changes, is:
Et
ADi;t+1Xit; Zit = Ait + ID (Xit; Zit) Ait+1
14
The expected market value of rm i by the uninformed public investor is:
Et
ADi;t+1Xit  Ait + bIDt+1 (Xit) Ait+1:
Therefore the di¤erence in the expected market value of the rm, VDi ;
from the information gap between the rm and the public is:
Et
VDi;t+1Xit; Zit = Et ADi;t+1Xit; Zit  Et ADi;t+1Xit
= 

ID (Xit; Zit)  bIDt+1 (Xit)Ai;t+1 < 0
It is clear therefore that if a rm faces a downgrade, there is overpricing
in the current market value of the rm at time t because of the increased
likelihood of a debt default. In other words, before a downgrade a rm enjoys
potential discrete benet in rm value from the presently higher rating, which
is consistent with the CR-CS theory (see Figure 1, Kisgen 2006). To re-
iterate, our focuses are that managers are concerned about the anticipated
future rating changes, and that managers understand the potential discrete
benet in rm value.
E¤ectively, the rm is in a position to explore mispricing by increasing
debt or equity at time t.10 When a rm faces a downgrade, its decision is
whether to raise equity or debt in order to exploit overpricing. These actions,
however, have costs, and therefore, rms must balance the associated costs
10In general, debt nancing benets rms by lowering the weighted average cost of
capital. Korteweg (2010) provides evidence for the net benets to leverage.
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and benets of debt and equity to decide the nancing choice.
We argue that badrms will prefer debt to equity since increasing eq-
uity will have limited benets, but immediate costs. The choice of increas-
ing equity at time t may cause signicant drops in the stock price on the
announcement of an equity issuance (Asquith and Mullins 1986). This is
because investors are aware of the problem of information asymmetry, and
believe that the rms stock is overvalued when the rm undertakes seasoned
equity o¤erings (Fama and French 2005).
By using debt nancing before a downgrade, badrms face a risk of
sending the rating further down the line. On the other hand, badrms
can take advantage of the relatively cheaper debt before the downgrade is
realized. The cost of debt capital reects the perceived creditworthiness of
the rm, and badrms may prefer to get the benets of leverage before the
downgrade. Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller (2005) also suggest
that rms with unfavorable private information are willing to pay the costs
on long-term debt. From the above analysis we arrive at our hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 : Badrms prefer to increase debt before a credit rating
downgrade.
Specically, the hypothesis states that: The relation between the change
in debt 4deti;t and the information gap, GDi;t+1; for a rm who anticipates
a downgrade is positive, i.e., 4deti;t = g
 
GDi;t+1

, g0 > 0. Notice that a test
of this hypothesis is a joint test of  > 0 and g0 > 0:
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If the results indicate that 4deti;t is not related to GDi;t+1, it will be a
result of either  = 0; which suggests that the rm does not have insider
information, and/or (g0 = 0), which suggests that the rm does not take
action according to our hypothesis.
3. Data and sample
3.1. Sample construction
We collect quarterly data of rm nancial and monthly Standard & Poor
(S&P) ratings data from Compustat, covering more than 30,000 active and
inactive publicly listed rms in the U.S. The sample covers all rms with
quarterly nancial data and at least one rating record during the sample
period from Q1 1985, when the ratings data begin, until Q4 2010. We exclude
rm-quarter observations with negative equity, i.e., leverage greater than
one.11
We further exclude utility companies (SIC 4900-4999) and nancial com-
panies (SIC 6000-6999). Myers (2001) points out that these companies have
a narrow menu of nancing choices and cannot adjust their capital structures
at relatively low costs. In addition, regulations relating to the disclosure poli-
cies of nancial rms are usually stricter than those for non-nancial rms.
11See the appendix for details on the variables we use in the analysis.
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3.2. Summary statistics
We classify a rm-quarter as a downgradewhen the rm gets downgraded
in the next quarter. Panels A and B of Table 1 show, respectively, summary
statistics for the no-downgrade sample, which contains 120,884 rm-quarter
observations, and the downgrade sample, which contains 1,376 rm-quarter
observations.12 The downgraded rms, compared to rms whose ratings are
not downgraded, have much higher leverage ratios (50.6% versus 23.5%),
lower liquidity (7.5% versus 19.2%), lower Growth (Market-to-Book ratio)
(1.09 versus 1.85), and hold more xed assets (37.8% versus 26.5%). All of
these point to deteriorating nancial conditions of the downgraded rms.
These results are consistent with the ndings in the capital structure liter-
ature that companies with relatively safe and tangible assets tend to borrow
more than companies with risky and intangible assets since intangible assets
are more likely to encounter losses under nancial distress (see, Myers 1984;
Frank and Goyal 2003). The downgraded rms also have higher average Size
(the log of sales), which is consistent with the notion that large companies
tend to borrow more than small rms (see, Myers 2001, and Frank and Goyal
2003). Interestingly, in terms of nancing activities, the downgraded rms,
on average, raise more debt (normalized by total assets) than those rms
whose ratings are not downgraded (3.7% versus 0.6%).
12Applying further restrictions on selecting downgraded rms such as those who are
downgraded more than once or downgraded by more than one notch may result in very
sample size, which undermines robust statistical analysis.
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[Insert Table 1 here]
4. Estimation results of the information gap model
4.1. Estimating the information gap
As outsiders do not possess insider information Zit; they estimate the logit
model for the probability of a credit rating downgrade as in equation 4 for
[LTD
D
i;t+1: From the view point of insiders (either the rm manager or the
rating agency), however, the outsidersestimation su¤ers from an omitted
variable (Zit) bias. Thus, the statistical signicance of the coe¢ cient esti-
mates are biased from the view point of those who possess insider information.
Table 2 reports the results of estimating credit rating downgrades in a logit
model. Firms with high leverage levels tend to be more likely to get credit
rating downgrades, while protable rms are less likely to be downgraded.
For the rm action variables, an increase in debt to total assets i.e. 4deti;t;
increases the probability of long-term rating downgrades. On the other hand,
an increase in equity to total assets, i.e. 4eqti;t; decreases the probability of
long-term rating downgrades, albeit statistically insignicant.
The quarter-end stock price, which reects investorsinformation of the
rm available to the market by the time of rm capital structure activities.
In utilizing such price information, we allow the exibility that investors
are able to gather signal about the nancial health of the rm. The result
shows an intuitive pattern that higher stock price is associated with a lower
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probability of a credit rating downgrade.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Next, we analyze the information gap between the insiders and outsiders.
The insiders know with certainty about the future rating changes, and hence
do not need to estimate the logit model as the outsiders do. Table 3 shows
that, for those rms whose ratings are not downgraded, outsiders who use
the logit model are nearly 99% correct in predicting non-occurance of a
downgrade. More interestingly, for those rms whose ratings are actually
downgraded, outsiders are only 4.1% correct in predicting downgrades, while
nearly 96% will fail to predict downgrades. These results suggest a poten-
tially large information gap.
[Insert Table 3 here]
4.2. Modeling of debt and equity changes due to an information gap
To investigate rm behavior due to the information gap, we run regressions as
in equations 7, 8 and 9 of the change in debt, equity and net debt, normalized
by total assets, on the information gaps in rating changes and rm-level
control variables. The rating changes take place in quarter t+ 1:We test the
e¤ects one quarter before (in quarter t) and in the same quarter of rating
changes (at time t+ 1):
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4deti;t+ = 0+1GLTDDi;t+1 + cXi;t+ 1 + "i;t+ ; (7)
4eqti;t+ = 0+1GLTDDi;t+1 + cXi;t+ 1 + "i;t+ (8)
4neti;t+ = 0+1GLTDDi;t+1 + cXi;t+ 1 + "i;t+ (9)
where  =(0; 1),  = 0 for one quarter before rating changes, and  = 1 for
the same quarter of rating changes. The coe¢ cients 1, 1 and 1 capture,
respectively, the e¤ects of adjustments in debt, equity and net debt (debt
minus equity) to the information gap pertaining to a long-term credit rating
downgrade in quarter t + 1. The vector of Xi;t+ 1 represents the control
variables. We control for both the industry and quarter xed e¤ects, and also
obtain clustered standard errors using the approach of Peterson (2009).13 We
obtain the variablesGLTDDi;t+1 from equation (6), having estimated LTD
D
i;t+1
using equation (3) as reported earlier. The e¤ect we are estimating is the
statistical and economic signicance of the information gap GLTDDi;t+1 on
the left-hand-side variables between the downgraded and non-downgraded
rms.
Our Hypothesis states that badrms prefer to take advantage of the
overvalued debt before a rating downgrade. Hence, it predicts a signicantly
positive 1 in equation (7), an insignicant  in equation (8), and a signi-
13We thank John McInnis for his SAS code of the clus-
tered standard errors adjustment, which is available at:
http://www.bhwang.com/a_research/z_codes/Clustering%20%28Code%29.txt
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cantly positive 1 in equation (9) when  = 0.
We now take a close scrutiny on the use of long-term and short-term
nancing to understand the ways rms apply when they anticipate rating
changes. To this end, we run the following regressions (eqs. 10 and 11) using
the dependent variables dened in Section 3.: the ratio of the current period
short-term debt change to previous period total assets, Sdeti;t, and the
ratio of the current period long-term debt change to previous period total
assets, Ldeti;t.
4Sdeti;t+ = S0 + S2GLTDDi;t+1 + ScXi;t+ 1+"i;t+ (10)
4Ldeti;t+ = L0 + L2GLTDDi;t+1 + LcXi;t+ 1+"i;t+ (11)
where  =(0; 1):
5. Estimation results of debt and equity changes
5.1. One quarter before rating changes
Table 4 reports the estimation results for debt nancing one quarter be-
fore changes in long-term credit ratings. In line with our Hypothesis the
information gap for a long-term credit rating downgrade GLTDDi;t+1 has a
positive coe¢ cient of 1.29% (t = 5.33) to changes in debt. Interestingly,
equity nancing eqti;t, in the second column, is not signicantly associated
with the rating downgrade variable (t = 0.02). The increase in net debt,
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in the third column, is 1.27% (t = 2.38). This evidence suggests that bad
rms embark on more net debt before the anticipated rating downgrade is
materialized. Notice that when our results would be driven by a reversed
causality argument, then we would expect similar e¤ects of debt issues and
stock repurchases on credit rating adjustments, and this is not what we nd.
[Insert Table 4 here]
The coe¢ cient estimates for the control variables in Table 4 are consistent
with the ndings in the literature in both the sign and statistical signicance.
The negative coe¢ cient of leverage (-0.0134, t = -11.04) indicates that Lever-
age in the previous quarter has a signicantly negative e¤ect on debt change
in the current quarter, i.e., rms with higher leverage ratios raise less debt.
The negative coe¢ cient of Liquidity (-0.0175, t = -11.96) indicates that rm
with cash and short-term investment opportunities choose to nance less by
debt. Prot is negatively related to equity change (-0.154, t = -66.95). These
results are consistent with the notion that protable rms have more internal
nancing resources available (Myers, 2001).
Consistent with the nding of Dittmar and Thakor (2007) that rms
with retained earnings tend to nance projects internally, Retained earnings
shows negative and statistically signicant coe¢ cients for the changes in debt
and equity. Firms holding valuable growth opportunities tend to increase
equity nancing (0.0014, t = 25.2) but not debt nancing (coe¢ cient value
is virtually zero) (see also, Myers 1984; Rajan and Zingales 1995). Tangibility
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is positively related to both debt and equity changes. NDTS is negatively
related to both debt change (-0.0264, t = -3.25) (see also, DeAngelo and
Masulis 1980; Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim 1984), and equity change (-0.0623,
t = -3.88).
In terms of the long-term and short-term debt mix, as reported in columns
4 and 5 of Table 4, the loading of the information gap variable GLTDDi;t+1
is positive and statistically signicant when explaining changes in long term
debt, while short-term debt does not respond to the information gap. This
indicates that badrms mainly raise long-term debt before a downgrade of
their long-term credit rating.
Overall, our ndings suggest that rms that will be downgraded tend to
take advantage of their currently higher credit rating. In line with Berger,
Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller (2005), rms with unfavorable private in-
formation are willing to pay the costs on long-term debt.
5.2. The same quarter of the rating changes
Because rms could potentially raise debt one day before an announced down-
grade, we also examine the relation between downgrades and capital structure
changes in the same quarter. Table 5 reports rmsnancing behavior in the
same quarter of rating changes, and conrms our earlier ndings that bad
rms signicantly increase debt. Badrms also do not signicantly increase
equity in the same quarter of the downgrade, which is similar to the insignif-
icant equity increase in the quarter before a downgrade, as reported in Table
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4. Note though that the capital structure change in Table 5 could also occur
right after a downgrade (while still in the same quarter) and issuing equity
could be attempts to increase the rms creditworthiness (see also Kisgen
2009).
[Insert Table 5 here]
We also nd that, in the same quarter when the news of a downgrade in
the long-term credit rating is announced, the increase of total debt of bad
rms rests on long-term debt increases 3.76% (t = 15.47). Again, this nding
suggests that badrms take advantage of the relatively cheaper long-term
debt before downgrades.
5.3. Investment-grade firms versus speculative-grade firms
We nd that rmsactions with respect to the anticipated rating changes
di¤er across rating categories. In particular, speculative-grade rms appear
to be more responsive in adjusting debt than investment-grade rms. Specif-
ically, we estimate equations 7, 8 and 9 for two sub-samples: rms with S&P
investment-grades (BBB and above) and rms with S&P speculative-grades
(below BBB) according to the S&P domestic long-term issuer credit rating
at time t+ 1 (the quarter when the rating change is announced).
Columns 6 and 7 of Table 4 and 5 show that before a downgrade bad
rms in the speculative-grade spectrum increase debt to utilize the informa-
tion gap. The e¤ect is weaker for rms with investment-grade debt ratings.
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These ndings suggest that speculative-grade rms are keener to take advan-
tage of the information gap than investment-grade rms, which is in line with
changes in credit ratings being more important for speculative-grade rms,
for example because lower ratings reduce the number of bond portfolio man-
agers that are allowed to invest in the bonds (Grinblatt and Titman 2002).
Intuitively, the information gap between the lower-rated rms and outsiders
is greater than that of the higher-rated rms, as for instance, fewer analysts
tend to follow lower-rated rms (Chung 2000).
5.4. Credit rating upgrades
We further analyze whether rms take actions with respect to the anticipated
rating upgrades. Similar to our analyses in earlier sections, we estimate a
logit model for the probability of a credit rating upgrade based on public
information as:
[LTD
U
i;t+1 = Prob
 
LTDU i;t+1 = 1
Xi;t : (12)
We report the results in Table 6. An increase in equity to total assets,
i.e. 4eqti;t; (debt to total assets, i.e. 4deti;t) is associated with higher
(lower) probability of long-term rating upgrades, albeit statistically insignif-
icant. Firms with larger size, higher stock price, higher liquidity and higher
prot tend more likely to get their credit ratings upgraded.
[Insert Table 6 here]
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We then analyze the information gap between the insiders and outsiders
as:
GLTDUi;t+1 = LTD
U
i;t+1  [LTD
U
i;t+1: (13)
Table 7 shows that, for those rms whose ratings are not upgraded (LTDup =
0), outsiders who use the logit model are more than 99% correct in predicting
non-occurance of an upgrade. For those rms whose ratings are actually
upgraded, outsiders are only 1.67% correct in predicting an upgrade, while by
more than 98% chance fail to predict an upgrade. There appears a potentially
large information gap, as indicated by GLTDup.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Next, we separately regress the nancing variables, i.e., the change in
debt, the change in equity, and the change in net debt, on the information
gap of a long-term credit rating upgrade GLTDUi;t+1, similar to eqs 7, 8 and
9. Panels A and B of Table 8 report, respectively, the estimation results
for one quarter before and the same quarter of the long-term credit rating
upgrade. In all columns of Table 8, the coe¢ cient of GLTDup is statistically
insignicant, suggesting that rms do not take signicant nancing actions
in the light of an upcoming rating upgrade. Intuitively, a good news on
the creditworthiness of a rm to arrives in the near future will drive down
its future costs of equity and debt capital. Firm therefore give priority to
securing the anticipated rating upgrade. Thus, it is not a surprise to nd
that the information gap does not appear to show any signicant e¤ect on
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the three nancing variables.
[Insert Table 8 here]
6. Conclusions
We investigate the impact of information asymmetry between rms and in-
vestors, created by the delay in the arrival of credit rating changes, upon
rmsnancing changes. Relative to public investors, rm managers and
rating agencies possess more precise and up-to-date knowledge and predic-
tions on the rms next-period ratings. This paper asks whether the superior
information of the rms allows them to adjust their nancing activities before
the news of rating changes is publicly disseminated.
We construct a measure of the information gap between rms and in-
vestors concerning credit rating downgrades in the next quarter. We present
a model in which outsiders predict rm rating changes based on the rms
actions and all other publicly available information. Our framework therefore
explicitly accommodates the ability of outsiders to infer the change in the
rm ratings by observing the rms actions on capital structure changes. The
information gap is thus dened as the di¤erence between the actual and the
forecasted rating changes. We then model the relation between the rms -
nancing adjustments before a downgrade and our measure of the information
gap, controlling for a set of conventional rm variables.
Our results indicate that rms take advantage of the information asym-
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metry and change their nancing accordingly. We nd that rms raise extra
debt in the quarter before a downgrade on the long-term credit rating, consis-
tent with our hypothesis that rms take advantage of the relatively cheaper
debt before downgrades. Moreover, the downgraded rms do not decrease
equity before downgrades, which is evidence against a reversed causality ar-
gument. Further, we conduct tests to analyze whether the information gap
of an anticipated credit rating upgrade exhibits certain association with the
nancing actions of a rm. Our evidence indicates that rms do not take
signicant actions in equity, debt or net debt, either one quarter before or
in the same quarter of a credit rating upgrade. This is consistent with the
notion that future costs of capital will be lower when the credit rating of a
rm will become higher in the near future.
The evidence suggests that the information gap on credit ratings between
rms and the market exists, and also that rms take advantage of the infor-
mation gap by changing their capital structures. Our ndings have important
implications for policy makers in that tightening the requirements for credit
rating agencies to provide timely updates on their rating outputs will reduce
asymmetric information and will be benecial for public investors and other
stakeholders.
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Appendix:
6.1. Firm action variables
In our analysis we examine the e¤ects on changes in debt, equity and net debt
for rm i in quarter t dened as follows:
4deti;t = Di;tAi;t 1 : debt change, where Di;t is long-term debt increase
(Compustat DLTISY)14 minus long-term debt reduction (Compustat DL-
TRY) plus the change in current debt (Compustat DLCCHY) for rm i in
quarter t, and Ai;t 1 is total asset (Compustat ATQ) of rm i in quarter
t  1.
4eqti;t = Ei;tAi;t 1 : equity change, where Ei;t is the sale of common and
preferred stock (Compustat SSTKY) minus purchases of common and pre-
ferred stock (Compustat PRSTKCY) for rm i in quarter t.
We also analyze net debt change (as in Kisgen (2006)) as the di¤erence
between deti;t and eqti;t , dened as neti;t =
Di;t Ei;t
Ai;t 1
.
We further look into details of debt changes by examining the e¤ects on
short term and long-term debt, respectively.
4Sdeti;t = 4SDi;tAi;t 1 , where 4SDi;t is the change in current debt (Compu-
stat DLCCHY) for rm i in quarter t.
4Ldeti;t = 4LDi;tAi;t 1 , where 4LDi;t is the long-term debt increase (Compu-
stat DLTISY) minus long-term debt reduction (Compustat DLTRY) for rm
i in quarter t.
6.2. State variables
We include the control variables (Xi;t) which are conventionally considered in
capital structure studies including: Leverage, Size, Price, Liquidity, Prot,
Earnings, Growth, Tangibility and Non-Debt Tax Shields (NDTS) to sep-
14The last letter Yin DLTISY indicates that the variable is year-to-date. We derive
quarterly values of observations for all variables using the year-to-date data.
34
arate their inuences from the role of information gap on rmsnancing
activities.15
Leveragei;t : the ratio of the sum of short-term debt (Sdet) (Compustat
DLCQ) and long-term debt (Ldet) (Compustat DLTTQ) to the sum of short-
term debt, long-term debt and stockholdersequity (Compust LSEQ minus
LTQ) for rm i in quarter t.
Sizei;t: the logarithm of sales (Compustat SALEQ) for rm i in quarter
t.
Pricei;t: the logarithm of the stocks quarterly closing price in the quarter
(Compustat PRCCQ) for rm i in quarter t.
Liquidityi;t: the ratio of cash and cash equivalent (Compustat CHEQ) to
total assets (Compustat ATQ) for rm i in quarter t.
Profiti;t: the ratio of EBITDA to total assets (Compustat ATQ) for rm
i in quarter t.16
Earningsi;t: the ratio of retained earnings (Compustat REQ) to total
assets (Compustat ATQ) for rm i in quarter t.
Growthi;t: the ratio of total book value of debt plus quarterly close price
(Compustat PRCCQ) times the number of common stock shares outstanding
(Compustat CSHOQ) to total asset (Compustat ATQ) for rm i in quarter
t.
15Kisgen (2006) shows signicant negative relations between leverage and debt nancing.
Titman and Wessels (1988) show that rm size, as indicated by the logarithm of sales,
is one of the crucial determinants of capital structure. Marsh (1982) shows that changes
in security prices alter debt/equity ratios. Myers (2001) and Fama and French (2002)
demonstrate that prot is an important factor that a¤ects capital structure. Market-to-
book ratio (dened as growth in our study) and tangibility are variables a¤ecting leverage
ratio in Rajan and Zingales (1995). Dividends and earnings policies relate tightly to the
increase of debt and equity sale (Titman and Wessels, 1988). We include liquidity (see
Kim, Mauer and Sherman, 1998) to control for possible impacts on leverage from rms
cash positions and non-debt tax shields (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980, and Bradley, Jarrell
and Kim, 1984).
16EBITDAi;t is the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization for rm
i at time t, which is calculated as the sum of pretax income (Compustat PIQ), interest
expense (Compustat TIEQ) and depreciation and amortization (Compustat DPQ).
35
Tangibilityi;t: the ratio of (net) property plant and equipment (Compu-
stat PPENTQ) to total asset (Compustat ATQ) for rm i in quarter t.
NDTSi;t: the ratio of deferred taxes and investment tax credit (Com-
pustat TXDITCQ) to total assets (Compustat ATQ) for rm i in quarter
t.
6.3. Forecasting rating changes
We estimate a logit model by regressing two distinct categories: downgrades
and others(no rating change or upgrades) of S&P Long Term Rating (oth-
ersis the reference category) on independent variables as re-written below:
LTDDi;t+1 = I
D(Xi;t) (14)
LTDDi;t+1 =
(
1; SPLT i;t+1 < SPLT i;t
0; SPLT i;t+1  SPLT i;t
t = 1; 2; : : : ; 47; where LTDDi;t+1 is the response variable that indicates the
rating change choice made by the rating agency. The state variables are
conventionally considered in capital structure studies including: Leverage,
Size, Price, Liquidity, Prot, Earnings, Growth, Tangibility and non-debt
tax shields (NDTS) (see also, Ederington and Yawitz, 1986), including rm
action variables: 4deti;t and 4eqti;t.
The predicted rating downgrade probability [LTD
D
i;t+1 for rm i in quarter
t+ 1 is given by:
[LTD
D
i;t+1 = Prob
 
LTDDi;t+1 = 1

=
exp(X0i;tb)
1 + exp(X0i;tb) (15)
The standard interpretation of the logit model is that for a one unit
change in the predictor variables, the outcome relative to the reference group
is expected to change by its respective parameter estimation given that other
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variables in the model are unchanged.
The estimation of (14) shows that the probability of downgrade [LTD
D
i;t+1
is decreasing with protability. The p-values from goodness of t test shows
that the model is a good t for the data overall.
For long-term credit ratings, 1.17% of the observations are downgrades.
Thus, downgrades are rare events, and the predictors could su¤er from small
sample bias. Therefore we use the King and Zeng (2001) rare events small
sample correction method for a binomial logistic model. This improves the
predictability of the probabilities.
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Figure 1  
The information transmission mechanism for Standard and Poor's from their website 
(https://www.spratings.com/about/about-credit-ratings/ratings-process.html).  
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Table 1 
Summary statistics of the sample 
The table lists summary statistics of the variables in our estimations. Panel A consists of the descriptive statistics 
for firms that are not downgraded in the next quarter, Panel B consists of firms that are downgraded in the next 
quarter. The sample is drawn from quarterly Compustat data, excluding financial and utility firms and firm-
quarters with negative equity values over the period Q1 1985 - Q4 2010. Details of the sample are presented in 
the appendix. 
  5th Pctl Mean 95th Pctl Std Dev 
Panel A: LTDdown = 0 (N = 120,884) 
Δdebt -0.055 0.006 0.075 0.279 
Δnet -0.093 -0.018 0.084 3.765 
ΔLdebt -0.025 0.004 0.038 0.081 
Δsdebt -0.045 0.002 0.053 0.269 
Δequity -0.020 0.024 0.033 3.846 
Leverage 0.000 0.235 0.711 0.246 
Size -0.931 3.332 7.515 2.531 
Price -1.050 1.941 3.989 1.577 
Liquidity 0.002 0.192 0.680 0.222 
Profit -0.132 0.006 0.086 0.297 
Earnings -4.565 -0.704 0.706 9.676 
Growth 0.445 1.851 5.000 3.688 
Tangibility 0.018 0.265 0.780 0.233 
NDTS 0.000 0.019 0.096 0.036 
Panel B: LTDdown = 1 (N = 1376)  
Δdebt -0.060 0.037 0.230 0.192 
Δnet -0.071 0.034 0.242 0.190 
ΔLdebt -0.036 0.037 0.207 0.188 
Δsdebt -0.065 -0.001 0.057 0.059 
Δequity -0.019 0.002 0.021 0.050 
Leverage 0.133 0.506 0.896 0.223 
Size 3.112 6.028 8.810 1.730 
Price 0.223 2.672 4.192 1.212 
Liquidity 0.002 0.075 0.278 0.108 
Profit -0.061 0.010 0.060 0.051 
Earnings -0.437 0.117 0.575 0.357 
Growth 0.477 1.094 2.459 0.937 
Tangibility 0.061 0.378 0.803 0.231 
NDTS 0.000 0.036 0.125 0.044 
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Table 2 
Logit estimates of changes in the long-term debt rating (LTD) in the next quarter 
This Table shows the coefficient estimates and z-statistics of the Logit model. LTDdown is the indicator of a 
downgrade of the S&P long term credit rating in the next quarter. The estimates of firm and quarter fixed effects are 
not presented. 
  LTDdown Frequency 
  0 103600 
  1 1124 
  Coefficient z-value 
Intercept -7.2655 -41.18 
Leverage 2.8808 18.72 
Size 0.4358 21.63 
Price -0.1294 -3.37 
Liquidity 0.1704 0.51 
Profit -2.4071 -9.16 
Earnings 0.5615 5.52 
Growth -0.1822 -3.82 
Tangibility 1.1203 6.48 
NDTS -1.9527 -2.25 
Δdebt 0.1219 3.06 
Δequity -0.0066 -1.25 
Likelihood Ratio Test 2100.89 
 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics of the information gap estimate (GLTDdown)  
The table lists summary statistics of the probability of a firm being downgraded, i.e., Prob(LTDdown = 1), the 
probability of not being downgraded, i.e. Prob(LTDdown = 0), and the information gap GLTDdown = LTDdown - 
Prob(LTDdown = 1). The probabilities are obtained from estimating the logit model (in Table 2).  
LTDdown = 0 
  
  
  
  
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Prob(LTDdown = 1) 103600 0.0104 0.0188 0.0000 0.5901 
Prob(LTDdown = 0) 103600 0.9896 0.0188 0.4099 1.0000 
GLTDdown 103600 -0.0104 0.0188 -0.5901 0.0000 
LTDdown = 1 
Prob(LTDdown = 1) 1124 0.0405 0.0359 0.0000 0.2643 
Prob(LTDdown = 0) 1124 0.9595 0.0359 0.7357 1.0000 
GLTDdown 1124 0.9595 0.0359 0.7357 1.0000 
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Table 4 
Impact of information gap on financing one quarter before the rating downgrade  
This Table shows the coefficient estimates (and t-statistics) from estimating equations (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11) for the changes in debt, equity and net debt (debt 
minus equity), respectively, for all the sample firms one quarter before a downgrade in the long-term credit rating. The results from estimating equation (7) for 
the change in debt for investment and speculative grade firms are also presented. The estimates of firm and quarter fixed effects are not displayed for brevity. 
 
Previous Changes in Debt Changes in Equity Changes in  Changes in   Changes in  Changes in Debt Changes in Debt 
Quarter          Debt minus equity Long-term Debt Short-term debt Investment Grade Speculative Grade 
  coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.0085 7.62 0.0156 7.12 -0.0071 -2.89 0.0020 2.13 0.0064 9.57 0.0085 7.64 0.0622 7.52 
GLTDdown 0.0129 5.33 0.0001 0.02 0.0127 2.38 0.0136 6.59 -0.0007 -0.49 -0.0005 -0.13 0.0107 2.55 
Leverage -0.0134 -11.04 0.0090 3.73 -0.0224 -8.28 -0.0026 -2.47 -0.0109 -14.74 -0.0154 -11.94 -0.0531 -8.62 
Size -0.0016 -10.33 -0.0093 -29.66 0.0076 21.67 -0.0010 -7.57 -0.0006 -6.38 -0.0014 -8.88 -0.0085 -9.66 
Price 0.0026 10.95 0.0113 23.93 -0.0087 -16.31 0.0021 10.09 0.0006 3.85 0.0020 8.39 0.0036 2.31 
Liquidity -0.0175 -11.96 -0.0190 -6.59 0.0015 0.47 -0.0068 -5.41 -0.0107 -12.11 -0.0173 -11.97 -0.0510 -4.82 
Profit 0.0003 0.23 -0.1542 -66.95 0.1545 59.51 0.0002 0.16 0.0001 0.17 -0.0001 -0.08 0.0187 0.76 
Earnings -0.0006 -8.48 -0.0062 -41.54 0.0056 33.05 -0.0003 -5.10 -0.0003 -6.81 -0.0006 -8.51 -0.0014 -0.44 
Growth 0.0000 1.49 0.0014 25.20 -0.0014 -21.69 0.0001 2.33 0.0000 -0.83 0.0000 1.34 0.0127 9.63 
Tangibility 0.0050 3.39 0.0118 4.06 -0.0068 -2.07 0.0052 4.16 -0.0002 -0.27 0.0038 2.51 0.0148 2.43 
NDTS -0.0264 -3.25 -0.0623 -3.88 0.0359 1.99 -0.0227 -3.27 -0.0037 -0.75 -0.0202 -2.42 -0.0477 -1.52 
Adj. R
2
 0.0066   0.1269   0.0966   0.0026   0.0065   0.0061   0.0405   
F-stat  31.78  673.05  495.31  12.89  31.47  27.06  17.85 
N 101756   101756   101756   101756   101756   92968   8788   
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Table 5 
Impact of information gap on financing same quarter as the rating downgrade  
This Table shows the coefficient estimates (and t-statistics) from estimating equations (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11) for the changes in debt, equity and net debt (debt 
minus equity), respectively, for all the sample firms in the same quarter of a downgrade in the long-term credit rating. The results from estimating equation (7) 
for the change in debt for investment and speculative grade firms are also presented. The estimates of firm and quarter fixed effects are not displayed for brevity. 
 
Same Changes in Debt Changes in Equity Changes in  Changes in   Changes in  Changes in Debt Changes in Debt 
Quarter          Debt minus equity Long-term Debt Short-term debt Investment Grade Speculative Grade 
  coeff t-stat coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.0038 3.02 0.0168 8.42 -0.0130 -5.49 0.0032 2.85 0.0006 0.91 0.0038 2.91 0.0467 5.93 
GLTDdown 0.0396 14.41 0.0024 0.56 0.0371 7.21 0.0376 15.47 0.0019 1.30 0.0265 6.02 0.0417 10.38 
Leverage -0.0123 -8.88 0.0138 6.29 -0.0261 -10.03 -0.0051 -4.16 -0.0072 -9.54 -0.0129 -8.50 -0.0463 -7.89 
Size -0.0013 -6.91 -0.0082 -28.73 0.0069 20.53 -0.0008 -5.06 -0.0004 -4.45 -0.0011 -5.88 -0.0065 -7.77 
Price 0.0026 9.65 0.0060 13.85 -0.0033 -6.53 0.0023 9.68 0.0003 1.98 0.0022 7.99 0.0038 2.56 
Liquidity -0.0135 -8.09 0.0094 3.57 -0.0229 -7.32 -0.0088 -5.97 -0.0047 -5.13 -0.0131 -7.69 -0.0319 -3.17 
Profit 0.0124 9.35 -0.0077 -3.65 0.0201 8.06 0.0049 4.16 0.0075 10.40 0.0120 9.15 0.0817 3.50 
Earnings -0.0017 -19.81 -0.0048 -35.22 0.0031 19.11 -0.0014 -18.08 -0.0003 -6.96 -0.0017 -19.78 -0.0034 -1.09 
Growth 0.0001 1.88 0.0005 9.06 -0.0004 -6.63 0.0000 0.43 0.0000 2.75 0.0001 1.83 0.0050 3.99 
Tangibility 0.0027 1.59 0.0118 4.45 -0.0091 -2.90 0.0033 2.22 -0.0006 -0.68 0.0017 0.99 0.0097 1.66 
NDTS -0.0247 -2.67 -0.0456 -3.12 0.0209 1.21 -0.0228 -2.78 -0.0019 -0.38 -0.0217 -2.22 -0.0383 -1.28 
Adj. R2 0.0091   0.0413   0.0239   0.0067   0.0054   0.0075   0.0368   
F-stat  43.31  200.49  114.14  32.35  25.92  33.07  16.25 
N 101756   101756   101756   101756   101756   92968   8788   
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Table 6 
Logit estimates of changes in the long-term debt rating (LTD) in the next quarter 
This Table shows the coefficient estimates and z-statistics of the Logit model. LTDup is the indicator of an upgrade 
in the S&P long term credit rating in the next quarter. The estimates of firm and quarter fixed effects are not 
presented. 
 
  LTDup Frequency 
 
0 104724 
  1 594 
  Coefficient z-value 
Intercept -8.5211 -34.55 
Leverage 2.5490 12.89 
Size 0.3129 11.83 
Price 0.2837 5.45 
Liquidity 0.8147 2.24 
Profit 0.4982 2.19 
Earnings 0.0032 0.06 
Growth -0.0480 -1.19 
Tangibility 0.2913 1.17 
NDTS -2.8608 -2.35 
Δdebt -0.7933 -1.26 
Δequity 0.0514 0.49 
Likelihood Ratio Test 916.19 
  
 
 
Table 7 
Descriptive statistics of the information gap estimate (GLTDup)  
The table lists summary statistics of the probability of a firm being upgraded in the long-term credit rating, i.e., 
Prob(LTDup = 1), the probability of not being upgraded i.e. Prob(LTDup = 0), and the information gap GLTDup = 
LTDup - Prob(LTDup = 1). The probabilities are obtained from estimating the logit model (in Table 6).  
LTDup = 0 
  
  
  
  
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Prob(LTDup = 1) 104130 0.0056 0.0091 0.0000 0.2345 
Prob(LTDup = 0) 104130 0.9944 0.0091 0.7655 1.0000 
GLTDup 104130 -0.0056 0.0091 -0.2345 0.0000 
LTDup = 1 
Prob(LTDup = 1) 594 0.0167 0.0147 0.0008 0.1002 
Prob(LTDup = 0) 594 0.9833 0.0147 0.8998 0.9992 
GLTDup 594 0.9833 0.0147 0.8998 0.9992 
 
 
44 
 
Table 8 
Impact of information gap on financing in the previous and the same quarter as the rating upgrade  
Panel A of this Table shows the coefficient estimates (and t-statistics) from estimating the changes in debt, equity and net debt (debt minus equity), respectively, for all the 
sample firms in the previous quarter of an upgrade in the long-term credit rating. Panel B shows the coefficient estimates (and t-statistics) from estimating the changes in 
debt, equity and net debt (debt minus equity), respectively, for all the sample firms in the same quarter of an upgrade in the long-term credit rating. 
 
 Panel A Previous Quarter   Panel B Same Quarter   
 
Changes in Debt Changes in Equity Changes in Changes in Debt Changes in Equity Changes in 
     
Debt minus equity 
  
Debt minus equity 
  coeff t-stat coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.0077 6.91 0.0109 9.08 -0.0033 -1.96 0.0023 1.82 0.0115 13.61 -0.0092 -6.05 
GLTDup 0.0021 0.67 -0.0002 -0.06 0.0023 0.49 0.0026 0.71 0.0024 0.99 0.0001 0.03 
Leverage -0.0133 -10.94 0.0083 6.31 -0.0215 -11.90 -0.0125 -9.13 0.007 7.56 -0.0195 -11.71 
Size -0.0016 -9.65 -0.0047 -26.65 0.0031 12.87 -0.0013 -7.22 -0.0034 -27.50 0.0021 9.30 
Price 0.0030 12.12 0.0036 13.54 -0.0006 -1.71 0.0032 11.62 0.0013 6.91 0.0019 5.74 
Liquidity -0.0177 -11.70 -0.0121 -7.41 -0.0055 -2.46 -0.0142 -8.30 -0.0051 -4.46 -0.009 -4.36 
Profit -0.0067 -3.37 -0.0439 -20.44 0.0372 12.57 0.0219 9.77 -0.0231 -15.29 0.045 16.52 
Earnings -0.0010 -10.26 -0.003 -26.94 0.0019 12.67 -0.003 -25.86 -0.0014 -17.73 -0.0016 -11.47 
Growth 0.0000 1.55 0.0004 12.63 -0.0003 -8.13 0.0000 0.85 0.0001 5.44 -0.0001 -2.32 
Tangibility 0.0055 3.76 0.0065 4.13 -0.0011 -0.48 0.0033 2.00 0.0071 6.37 -0.0038 -1.89 
NDTS -0.0292 -3.65 -0.0296 -3.42 0.0004 0.04 -0.0268 -2.97 -0.0366 -6.03 0.0098 0.89 
Adj. R2 0.0070   0.0334   0.0142   0.0073   0.0311   0.0116   
F-stat   32.21 
 
152.98 
 
64.26 
 
48.79 
 
48.79 
 
52.68 
N 116482   116482   116482   116482   116482   116482   
 
 
